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LAWYER ETHICS AND THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE: A CALL TO ACTION
I.	INTRODUCTION

Investigations and prosecutions of money laundering1 and terrorist financing2
crimes attract global media attention. 3 Academic institutions and professional
organizations are devoting more attention to these crimes and their consequences4
1.

“Money laundering is the act of converting money gained from illegal activity, such as drug smuggling,
into money that appears legitimate and in which the source cannot be traced to the illegal activity.” Peter
Reuter & Edwin M. Truman, How Much Money Is Laundered?, in Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight
Against Money Laundering 9 (2004) (quoting U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-96-105,
Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas 1 (1996)).

2.

“Terrorism financing . . . typically involves money from legal pursuits that is converted into forms that
facilitate acts of violence for political purposes.” Reuter & Truman, supra note 1, at 9.

3.

See Richard K. Gordon, Losing the War Against Dirty Money: Rethinking Global Standards on Preventing
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 503, 503–06 (2011). One
example of an event attracting global attention concerns the French bank BNP Paribas’s guilty plea to
charges of hiding the names of Sudanese and Iranian clients when it sent transactions through the U.S.
financial system. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Admits Guilt and Agrees to Pay $8.9 Billion
Fine to U.S., N.Y. Times, July 1, 2014, at B1. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York
accused BNP of “perpetrating . . . a tour de fraud.” Id. BNP’s chief operating officers allegedly ignored the
warnings of its compliance officers in dealing with Iran and Sudan, with one BNP compliance manager
stating that “[Sudan] hosted Osama bin Laden.” Id. BNP enlisted the help of the “highest rungs of French
government” to avoid the charges, including “President Francois Hollande [who] made unusually direct
and personal appeals to President [Barack] Obama” for assistance. Id.; see Susanne Craig & James C.
McKinley, Jr., French Bank’s Guilty Plea Is Latest Big Settlement to Bolster State’s Fiscal Position, N.Y. Times,
July 2, 2014, at A22 (noting that BNP “is the seventh major bank to be caught trying to evade United
States sanctions in a five-year investigation” by the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office and federal
authorities, and concluding that these investigations have led to approximately $12 billion in fines, which
have bolstered New York’s financial position as well as that of the District Attorney’s Office); Declan
Walsh, Britain Frees Pakistani in Financial Inquiry, N.Y. Times, June 8, 2014, at A10 (reporting that
British police will continue to investigate the popular Pakistani political leader, Altaf Hussain, a British
citizen since 2002, who was arrested and held for four days on suspicion of money laundering, and that
police are also investigating whether $600,000 in cash seized during raids on Hussain’s home and office in
2012 and 2013 are the proceeds of criminal activity). The media attention covers a wide variety of related
matters. For example, one article discussed the selection of a possible monitor for Credit Suisse and how
former prosecutors of entities are selected by their former government employers to be monitors, creating
an “‘old boys’ network” for lucrative appointments to ensure entity compliance with settlement agreements.
See Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Old Foe a Monitor of Credit Suisse, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2014,
at B1. This network, and the lack of transparency surrounding such monitoring, raises questions about the
efficacy of monitoring. See id. (reporting that “the consulting firm Deloitte [was fined] $10 million and
barred . . . from advising banks in New York for one year . . . [for] watering down a report about . . . the
British bank, Standard Chartered,” and also noting that former Deputy U.S. Attorney Shirah Neiman was
selected to monitor BNP Paribas, which was suspected of transferring millions of dollars through its U.S.
operations on behalf of Sudan and other countries that the United States blacklisted, noting that the bank
is expected to pay $8 billion in penalties and plead guilty to criminal wrongdoing); id. at B7; Ben Protess,
Senior U.S. Prosecutor Who Fought Wall St. Is Departing, N.Y. Times, June 26, 2014, at B4 (reporting that
Lorin L. Reisner, the director of the criminal division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, is the
latest government lawyer to go “through the . . . revolving door,” back to private practice and, while in
office, led BNP to move closer to pleading guilty for improperly transferring money for Sudan).

4.

See New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial
System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014); American Bar Association Center for Professional
Responsibility Symposium, 40th ABA National Conference on Professional Responsibility (May 29, 2014);
American Association of Law Schools Symposium, Professional Responsibility: The Transformative Effect
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amidst a growing consensus that money laundering and terrorist financing activities
pose a significant risk to the economic, political, and social order of nations.5
The gravity of this risk in the international context is reflected, in part, by the
shopping mall killings in Nairobi, Kenya6 and an attack in Moscow, Russia in 2013,7
both of which required significant planning and financial support.8 In the wake of
of International Initiatives on Lawyer Practice and Regulation: A Case Study Focusing on FATF and its
2008 Lawyer Guidance (Jan. 8, 2010). The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) program
produced several articles published in the American Bar Association Journal of the Professional Lawyer. See, e.g.,
Paul D. Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer Guidance and Regulation of the Legal
Profession, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 165, 167 (examining, in part, “[t]he potential impact of the FATF on U.S.
lawyer regulation” by referencing developments in Canada and Australia); Kevin L. Shepherd, The
Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good
Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 83 (highlighting the creation of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) and dispensing advice for lawyers); Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the
Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 3 [hereinafter Terry, Intro
to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance] (providing an overview of the FATF and related developments, such as
the governmental responses to the FATF).
5.

See Peter J. Quirk, Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. 96/66, 1996), reprinted in 2 Trends in Organized Crime 10 (1997) (“[M]oney laundering can
distort economic data and thus distort macroeconomic analysis and policymaking. [This may have] direct
effects on saving resulting from induced changes in income distribution and from the erosion of confidence
in financial markets.”). Quirk concludes that money laundering has a “depressant effect on growth.” Id.; see
also Editorial, Nigerian Girls Deserve Continued Attention: Our View, USA Today, (Aug. 5, 2014, 7:35
PM), http://w w w.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/05/nigerian-schoolgirls-boko-harambringbackourgirls-editorials-debates/13643531/; Landon Thomas, Jr. & Raphael Minder, Banco Espírito
Santo Patriarch Humbled Amid Bailout, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/08/05/business/international/banco-esprito-santo-patriarch-humbled-amid-bailout.html
(noting the arrest of Ricardo Silva Salgado, the former chairman of Portugal’s Banco Espírito Santo, for
money laundering and his family’s involvement in international businesses, and reporting Europe and
Portugal’s $6.6 billion emergency bailout of the bank on August 3, 2014 to quell rattled markets that
harmed investors); see generally Jack Ewing, Legal Costs Push Deutsche Bank to a Loss, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
2014, at B12 (highlighting that Deutsche Bank announced a net loss of approximately $117 million (or €92
million) due to legal costs, in part, related to “questions about its role in financial transactions carried out
on behalf of nations facing international sanctions”).

6.

Jeffrey Gettleman & Nicholas Kulish, Mall Becomes War Zone as Gunmen Kill Dozens in Nairobi Terror
Attack, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2013, at A1 (describing the terrorist attack at the Nairobi mall as the most
“chilling” in East Africa since al-Qaeda attacked two American embassies in 1998, and noting that a
secret U.N. report described the assault as “complex” and that an African Union official described the
terrorists as “trained”); Daniel Howden, Terror in Nairobi: The Full Story Behind Al-Shabaab’s Mall Attack,
Guardian, (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/westgate-mallattacks-kenya (providing a detailed report of the terror and mayhem of the September 21, 2013 attack on
Nairobi’s premier shopping mall). Nicholas Kulish et al., Carnage in Mall Shows Resilience of Terror Group,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2013, at A1 (revealing “an extensive and complex financial support system” by
Al-Shaba[a]b supporters in Kenya “to sustain their own activities, sponsor the travel of recruits to
Somalia . . . and provide financial contributions to the jihadist cause,” and noting that Kenyan President
Uhuru Kenyatta described this as an “international war” and stating that “we have to join hands and work
together to see it destroyed”).

7.

See Fabien Tepper, Volgograd Bomber Planned to Attack Moscow, Christian Sci. Monitor (Oct. 22,
2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2013/1022/Volgograd-bomber-planned-to-attack-Moscow.

8.

See Roberto Durrieu, Rethinking Money Laundering & Financing of Terrorism in International
Law 67 (2013) (“[T]errorist[] . . . groups require financial support to finance their activities and enhance their
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the horrific September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has become particularly
sensitive to terrorism and its financing.9
The United States and nations worldwide perceive themselves in a dire struggle
to eliminate the evils of money laundering and terrorist financing.10 The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia recently donated $100 million to the U.N. Counter-Terrorism Centre
to “help provide the tools, technologies and methods to confront and eliminate the
threat of terrorism.”11 In acknowledging the gift, U.N. Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon stated, “The recent disturbing upsurge of terrorism in a number of countries
and regions of the world, most dramatically demonstrated by the so-called Islamic
State in Iraq, underscores the challenges before us.”12
power.”); id. at 66–72 (discussing the link between money laundering and terrorism financing, money
laundering constituting one of the four ways to finance terrorism). Although overall financial support for a
terrorist organization may be great, the cost of a particular operation may be surprisingly small. For example,
the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that al-Qaeda’s pre–September 11, 2001 annual operating budget
at $30 million, whereas the cost of planning and executing the attacks was less than $300,000. Id. at 67–68.
9.

See generally John Roth et al., National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States: Monograph on Terrorist Financing (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/
staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf; Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
1 (2010) [hereinafter Good Practices Guidance], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/voluntary_good_practices_guidance.pdf (noting that the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and elsewhere prompted the FATF to issue
Special Recommendations on terrorist financing); see also Jodi Rudoren, Deal Reached on Gaza
Reconstruction, Palestinian Leader Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2014, at A8 (reflecting the United States’
concern over the financing of terrorism by reporting that the Palestinian Authority “maintains that it
cannot send money to anyone affiliated with Hamas, for fear of risking financial support from . . . the
United States” and other countries “that consider Hamas a terrorist group”). The Pentagon was also
attacked on September 11, 2001 and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania before it could
strike Washington, D.C. September 11th Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/
september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/ (last updated Sept. 8, 2014, 12:54 PM).

10.

See Chad Bray, UBS and Deutsche Bank Disclose New Inquiries Over ‘Dark Pools’, N.Y. Times (July 29, 2014,
8:26 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/ubs-and-deutsche-bank-disclose-new-inquiriesover-dark-pools/ (discussing France’s formal investigation of UBS of Switzerland regarding charges of
money laundering and tax fraud, claiming the bank helped French clients hide assets, and noting that UBS
was ordered to post bail in excess of €1 billion); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Scrutiny for Banks
Is Shifting to Germany, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2014, at B1 (reporting settlement talks with Germany’s second
largest bank, Commerzbank, over dealings with Iran and other blacklisted countries, and that U.S.
criminal sanctions cases against European banks began in 2009 with British bank Lloyds, followed by
Credit Suisse, HBC, Standard Chartered, Barclays, ING of the Netherlands, and then BNP that alone
paid a record $8.9 million penalty and plead guilty to criminal charges in 2014 for processing transactions
with countries on the U.S. sanction list); see generally Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015)
[hereinafter Members and Observers] (listing the FATF’s national and regional members).

11.

Rick Gladstone, Saudis Give $100 Million to U.N. Fight on Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2014, at A8
(quoting Abdel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States). The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia gave $10 million to help create a U.N. counterterrorism committee only three years earlier.
Id. The recent $100 million donation reflects the Kingdom’s continuing commitment to, and faith in,
the importance of international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism. Id.

12.

Id. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has ruthlessly murdered religious minorities and others in
northern Iraq and elsewhere. President Obama and others described ISIS’s threat to thousands of
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Addressing the United States’ “Global War on Terror,” David S. Cohen, the U.S.
Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence,
recently said, “The United States needs to remain involved in the world, but does not
necessarily need to remain involved just through military power.”13 Officials are
increasingly focused on other effective ways to project American power, in particular, by
adopting global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF)
policies.14 The United States adopted such policies more than a generation earlier when
it became a founding member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).15
The FATF represents the gold standard in the global fight against money
laundering and terrorist financing and promises to change the way lawyers practice
law in the United States.16 However, the FATF, in some respects, remains a perpetual
work in progress17 and must adapt its normative structure and methodologies to the
increasingly sophisticated, ever-morphing criminal practices of money laundering and
Yazidis, a religious minority, as genocide. See Rod Nordland, Despite U.S. Claims, Yazidis Say Crisis Is
Not Over, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A8; Marlise Simons, Spurred by ISIS Violence, Nations Mull
How to Press for Justice in Conflicts, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/
world/spurred-by-isis-violence-nations-mull-how-to-press-for-justice-in-conf licts.html; Rick
Gladstone, U.N. Pursues Bid to Stifle Rebels in Iraq, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A8 (highlighting that
the United Nations is galvanized by the brutality of ISIS’s human rights violations in Iraq and is
adopting a resolution aimed at choking their sources of money, weapons, and foreign recruits by placing
its leaders on an international blacklist, banning their travel and freezing their assets).
13.

Annie Lowrey, Aiming Financial Weapons from Treasury War Room, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2014, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/aiming-financial-weapons-from-war-room-attreasury.html. One way for the “United States . . . to [be] involved in the world,” id., is for it to subject
foreign banks and other companies to the United States’ regulatory scrutiny. For example, U.S. regulators
recently criticized one of Europe’s largest banks, Deutsche Bank, for “serious problems with the bank’s
financial reporting procedures and oversight.” Matthew Goldstein, Fed Is Said to Criticize Deutsche Bank’s
Oversight and Reporting Efforts, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2014, at B3 (discussing the New York Federal
Reserve Bank’s letter to Deutsche Bank directing it “to fix problems in its financial reporting procedures”
that have existed for several years, and the U.S. efforts to ensure the financial soundness of banks).

14.

See Lowrey, supra note 13. “Mr. Cohen oversees the obscure Office of Foreign Assets Control, the engine
that creates and administers the steadily increasing number of financial sanctions” directed against Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard to “Mexican drug traffickers to cronies of Russia’s President Vladimir V. Putin.” Id.
Sanctions have been used to influence the policies of North Korea, South Sudan, Syria, and other nations.
Although some economists question the impact of sanctions, one expert declared that “[t]here’s no doubt
that sanctions have become the dominant instrument of coercive statecraft.” Id. at B5 (quoting Mark
Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies).

15.

Durrieu, supra note 8, at 121 n.396.

16.

See id. at 121 (writing that the FATF provides the key legal standards for fighting money laundering
and terrorist financing); see also Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, at I-3 (2d ed. 2006) (referring to the
FATF as the “international standard setter for anti-money laundering (AML) efforts”); see discussion
infra Part III (describing the origin, mission, and organizational or normative structure of the FATF).

17.

See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism
Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 Nw. J. Int’l
L. & Bus. 137, 142 (2011) (“The FATF [AML and comabting the financing of terroism (CFT)]
normative structure . . . constantly adapt[s] to new and changing [money laundering (ML) and terrorist
financing (TF)] activities and methodologies.”).

461

LAWYER ETHICS AND THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE: A CALL TO ACTION

terrorist financing.18 The FATF must also continually ensure that its member states
are complying with the FATF’s AML and CTF standards.19 Some leaders in the legal
profession are concerned with the effect that current FATF policies have on lawyers,
and are especially worried about possible future changes in FATF policies that could
affect the delivery of legal services.20
This article discusses the FATF and its potential impact on the delivery of legal
services in the United States.21 Part II briefly discusses the problems associated with
money laundering and terrorist financing. Part III examines the history and scope of
the FATF, including its expansive Recommendations designed to prevent these
crimes. Part IV considers some of the ethical dimensions of the FATF’s policies and
their impact both on the legal profession and the delivery of legal services. Specifically,
18.

See Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, The Risk-Based Approach in the New European AntiMoney Laundering Legislation: A Law and Economics View, 5 Rev. L. & Econ. 931, 936 (2009) (acknowledging
that money launderers have a deep knowledge of AML detection risks and “take counter-measures to hide
their financial activities,” demanding greater cooperation and reporting by financial institutions); Schott,
supra note 16, at ix (“Efforts to launder money and finance terrorism have been evolving rapidly in recent
years in response to heightened countermeasures.”); Shima Baradaran et al., Funding Terror, 162 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 477, 489 (2014) (“Traffickers constantly employ the latest technologies to keep one step ahead of law
enforcement efforts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally infra Part III.

19.

See Ben Protess & Chad Bray, Caught Backsliding, Standard Chartered Is Fined $300 Million, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 20, 2014, at B1 (reporting that Standard Chartered failed to honor an earlier promise “to weed out
transactions prone to money-laundering” and was fined $300 million, on top of $667 million in fines in
2012 for dealing with blacklisted countries, and that the Standard Chartered, New York branch is
suspended from the important business of “dollar clearing,” affecting approximately 300 clients); Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, British Bank Faces Action, Again, by New York State, N.Y. Times, Aug.
6, 2014, at B1 (covering New York’s action against Standard Chartered over a breakdown in its computer
system that detects transactions vulnerable to money laundering, and the bank’s claim that the problems
were merely “technical” and not corporate recidivism since the bank was fined $340 million in 2012).

20. Professor Paul D. Paton discusses two FATF polices creating concern in the legal profession:

Recommendation 12, which requires lawyers to follow certain client due diligence protocols; and
Recommendation 16, which requires lawyers to report confidential client information involving
suspicious transactions. See Paton, supra note 4, at 170. “Both [Recommendations] place demands that
interfere with the traditional self-regulating approach and independence of the legal profession.” Id. at
170–71; see also Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3 (expressing concern about FATF-related
regulation of the profession by the federal government and describing goals “to encourage lawyers to
develop and implement voluntary, but effective, risk-based approaches consistent with the [FATF]
Lawyer Guidance, thereby negating the need for federal regulation of the legal profession”).

21.

This article reflects my involvement in New York Law School’s 2014 symposium entitled “Combating
Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task Force,” the first academic
event hosted by a law school to address these important issues. New York Law School Law Review
Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial System: The Financial Action Task
Force (Apr. 25, 2014); see Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering &
Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 487, 488 (2014–2015) (noting New York Law School’s
groundbreaking academic symposium). The AALS Professional Responsibility Section also sponsored
an academic program entitled “The Transformative Effect of International Initiatives on Lawyer
Practice and Regulation: A Case Study Focusing on FATF and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance” at the
AALS’s Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. in 2010, which is available at: https://memberaccess.
aals.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=SesDetails& ses_key=e7ca3e51-5520-4238-b04d5e7e7aaaed2f (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); see also Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra
note 4 (providing a broad but comprehensive overview of the topic).
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Part IV asserts that the FATF’s Customer Due Diligence (CDD) Recommendations
offer lawyers a valuable tool for avoiding clients who are involved in money laundering
or terrorist financing.22 Part IV also addresses, from an interdisciplinary perspective,
the reasons why some in the legal profession resist FATF policies.
This article concludes by arguing that the FATF merits the legal profession’s
continued attention. Some FATF efforts are troubling, particularly Recommendation
20, which suggests that lawyers should secretly file suspicious transaction reports (STRs)
on certain clients.23 However, other FATF efforts represent positive developments for
the bar. For example, lawyers are well-advised to embrace the FATF’s CDD
Recommendations as a good practice standard.24 The legal profession should be careful
about dismissing useful changes to the practice of law merely because external authorities
drive those changes.25 The conclusion also recommends ways for the profession to better
implement the FATF’s CDD Recommendations.
II. MONEY LAUNDERING: SOCIETY’S HIDDEN CANCER

A. An Overview of the Problem

This part of the article briefly examines money laundering to provide a context for
considering lawyer ethics issues in light of the FATF’s mission to eliminate this crime.26
22.

In this article, “CDD” refers to “customer due diligence,” and tracks the FATF’s use of that abbreviation
to promote consistency with FATF terminology. CDD could just as appropriately refer to “client due
diligence,” since “client” is a more common way of referring to a lawyer’s customer.

23.

Fin. Action Task Force, The FATF Recommendations 20 (Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter 2012
Recommendations], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/
pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (calling for lawyers to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) with
financial intelligence units); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence,
Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Formal Opinion 463],
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/
formal_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf. Formal Opinion 463 emphasizes that “mandatory reporting of
suspicion about a client is in conflict with [the American Bar Association (ABA) Model] Rules [of
Professional Conduct] 1.6 and 1.8.” Id. at 1. Cf. Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, 48 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 337, 337, 393–94 n.256 (2014) (arguing from a Coasean economics perspective that the profession’s
confidentiality rules are unnecessary and, worse yet, “undermine public trust in the legal system and
diminish transparency and cooperation in society,” and reporting that empirical studies demonstrate that
clients do not rely on confidentiality rules when communicating with their lawyers).

24.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19 (Recommendation 22) (mandating that lawyers and
other designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are subject to the FATF’s
extensive CDD regime).

25.

See Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2635, 2636 n.6 (2014)
(“‘[S]tate supreme courts were . . . the prime regulators [and] typically act[ed] in interplay with the
bar’” . . . and “lawyers drafted rules to promote their own interests in a self-regulatory context.” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 959, 965 (2009)).

26. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 429 (“Legal practitioners and scholars . . . dive into the legal devices against

[money laundering and terrorist financing] without enough consideration to the extra-legal factors.
However, it is critically important to understand the contours of the problem before any useful legal
discussion and policy recommendation is derived. . . . [W]e need to understand the meaning, causes and
effects of these phenomena . . . .”).
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The line between money laundering and terrorism financing is occasionally blurry
because the proceeds of money laundering may be used to fund terrorism.27 There are,
however, important differences between the two. 28 For example, unlike money
laundering, terrorism financing may stem from legitimate funding sources, such as
private donations.29 Most importantly, the primary goal of money laundering is to
realize criminal financial gains.30 By contrast, the primary goal of terrorism financing
is to instill terror from acts of violence, or threats thereof, to further a political purpose.31
Although an in-depth discussion regarding the complexities of terrorist financing is
beyond the scope of this article, this distinction is important to note.
Prior to 1986, money laundering was not a crime anywhere in the world; now, over
170 countries have criminalized it.32 It is difficult to discern the amount of money being
laundered at a given time for several reasons. First, the crime of money laundering is
geared towards secrecy because of the desire to conceal the source of illegal funds that
are later converted to legitimate purposes.33 Second, money launderers often move funds
across national borders to further obfuscate the origins of illegal funds by taking
advantage of the differences between countries’ political, legal, and economic regimes.34
27.

See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 66–72 (discussing generally the nexus between money laundering and terrorist
financing, and noting that “terrorist groups also need to practice money laundering, after committing a
crime”). “[T]he terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, [receives] about forty percent of its funds from drug trafficking,
twenty percent from extortion, and about ten percent from kidnapping.” Id. at 69 (citing Fletcher Baldwin,
Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 3, 4 (2002)); see also
Protess & Bray, supra note 19, (recognizing the connection between money laundering and terrorism). “If a
bank fails to live up to its commitments, there should be consequences. That is particularly true in an area
as serious as anti-money-laundering compliance, which is vital to helping prevent terrorism and vile human
rights abuses.” Id. (quoting New York State’s principal bank regulator, Superintendent of Financial Services,
Ben Lawsky). New York regulators recently reopened their investigation of Standard Chartered and are
considering revisiting settlements with some of the world’s biggest banks. Ben Protess & Jessica SilverGreenberg, Prosecutors Suspect Repeat Offenses on Wall Street, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:56 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/prosecutors-wrestling-with-wall-streets-repeat-offenders/ (“The cycle
of misbehavior [(i.e., conducting transactions involving blacklisted countries)] is difficult to break”).

28. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasizing that money laundering must be excluded from the

definition of terrorist financing).

29. Id. at 71.
30. Id.
31.

Id. at 66–67.

32.

In 1986, the United States and the United Kingdom were the first two countries to criminalize money
laundering, and criminalization moved quickly to the international level with the signature of the
Vienna Convention in 1988. Id. at 101. Roberto Durrieu argues that money laundering first evolved in
the 1970s in the United States and not in the 1980s as many scholars suggest, specifically noting the
U.S. Bank Secrecy Act enacted on October 26, 1970 as “the first effective effort to detect and sanction
the problem of hiding ill-gotten assets from law enforcement, [a process] which . . . later on . . .
acquire[d] the label of ‘money laundering law.’” Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).

33.

Reuter & Truman, supra note 1, at 9.

34. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-6. See generally Alison Smale, Austrian Court Unblocks Assets of Former

U.S. Ambassador’s Wife, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2014, at A8 (reporting on an international investigation
by the U.S. Department of Justice of possible money laundering and tax evasion involving a former U.S.
ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, and his wife).
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While the total amount of money currently being laundered is hard to quantify, it
is generally believed to be enormous. It is estimated that “[c]riminals, especially drug
traffickers, may have laundered around $1.6 trillion, or 2.7 per cent of global [gross
domestic product (GDP)], in 2009, according to a new report by [the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime].”35 This enormous amount appears to continue a trend, as
the International Monetary Fund estimated in 1996, that the aggregate amount of
laundered funds was between two and five percent of the world’s annual GDP, equaling
between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion.36 Another report near that time provided an
even greater estimate, noting that in 1995 alone, $2.85 trillion was laundered globally.37
Money laundering often occurs in countries with complex and highly developed
financial systems that facilitate the initial placement or deposit of funds into accounts,
securities, or insurance instruments. 38 The funds are then “layered” and moved
through national and international financial systems to sanitize their origin. 39
B. The Corrosive Effects of Money Laundering

Regardless of where it occurs, successful money laundering permits criminals to
“use[] their financial gains to expand their criminal pursuits and foster[] illegal
activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, [and the] illicit trafficking and
exploitation of human beings.”40 Money laundering also imperils the reputation of
35.

Press Release, United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, UNODC Estimates that Criminals May
Have Laundered US$1.6 Trillion in 2009 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
press/releases/2011/October/unodc-estimates-that-criminals-may-have-laundered-usdollar-1.6trillion-in-2009.html.

36. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-6 to -7. (citing Vito Tanzi, Money Laundering and the International

Finance System 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 96/55, 1996)).

37.

John Walker & Brigitte Unger, Measuring Global Money Laundering: “The Walker Gravity Model”, 5 Rev.
L. & Econ. 821, 824 (2009).

38. See Schott, supra note 16, at I-7.
39.

Id. at II-1. A money laundering scheme generally has three phases, “placement,” “layering,” and
“integration.” Diane Marie Amann, Spotting Money Launderers: A Better Way to Fight Organized Crime?,
27 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 199, 214–15 (2000). Professor Amann describes the process as follows:
During the placement phase, illegal proceeds are consolidated—often by filtering
through a casino, restaurant, or other high-cash-volume front business—then sent
outside the United States via electronic transfer or physical transport. During the
layering phase, funds are deposited in a bank in a haven jurisdiction—so called because
the jurisdiction enforces bank secrecy and permits anonymous shell corporations—then
transferred to the local branch of a reputable international, often European, bank.
During the integration phase, funds are wired from the branch to the main bank, then
returned to the United States for use as apparently legitimate funds.

Id. at 214–15 (footnotes omitted); see also Lisa A. Barbot, Money Laundering: An International Challenge,
3 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 161, 167 (1995) (identifying “the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
Costa Rica, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, [and] Panama” as “haven” jurisdictions).
40. Schott, supra note 16, at II-1; see also Scott Shane & Ben Hubbard, ISIS Displaying a Deft Command of

Varied Media, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isisdisplaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media.html (describing the terrorist group as “flush with wealth
from kidnappings, oil piracy, bank robbery and extortion,” representing a formidable challenge).
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national financial systems and the stability of individual institutions identified as
money laundering participants.41 For example, depositors and borrowers will transfer
their business from such institutions to safer financial partners, reducing a bank’s
source of funding and weakening a bank’s loan portfolio.42
There are other reasons for establishing a world order against money laundering
besides its potential negative impact on nations’ financial systems.43 Those reasons
include the desire to: (1) undermine organized crime;44 (2) ensure morally that crime
should not pay;45 (3) promote the administration of justice by effectively investigating
the secretive crime of money laundering, which should facilitate the investigations of
the predicate offenses, a key public interest;46 and (4) preclude money laundering
from undermining the stability and security of countries.47
Ultimately, money laundering is a hidden, complex, and serious global problem that
persists, and perhaps has even increased since the Great Recession despite national and
international efforts to eliminate it.48 World leaders recognize that the ability to prevent
money laundering transcends any single nation’s resources and enforcement efforts,49
and ultimately requires coherent standards and a globally harmonized legal approach.50
III.	THE FATF’S GENESIS AND SCOPE

A. The FATF Structure and Mandate

In 1989, the ministers of the world’s major industrialized nations created the
FATF to coordinate efforts to prevent money laundering within the international

41.

See Schott, supra note 16, at II-4 to -5.

42.

Id. at II-5.

43.

See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 76 (concluding that there is no consensus in the academy regarding the
reasons for prohibiting money laundering, and noting one author’s belief that the inability to control the
increase in transnational crime has prompted more rhetoric and effort to establish an “international
monetary movement enforcement regime”).

44. Id. at 78–80.
45.

Id. at 89–91.

46. Id. at 91–92.
47.

Id. at 92–93.

48. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 445; see, e.g., Baradaran et al., supra note 18, at 480–84; James K. Jackson,

Congressional Research Service Report RS21904: The Financial Action Task Force: An
Overview 8 (2012) [hereinafter CRS Report], available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS21904.pdf (“The economic implications of money laundering and terrorist financing pose another set
of issues that argue for gaining greater control over this type of activity. According to the [International
Monetary Fund], money laundering accounts for between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion in economic
activity annually.”).

49. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 445 (reporting that the United Nations Security Council has endorsed the

FATF, supporting international action to combat money laundering).

50. Id.
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financial system and member states’ domestic systems.51 The FATF is an unelected,
inter-governmental body devoid of lawmaking authority; rather, it relies on the
political will of its members to adopt AML and CTF standards.52 The FATF is
comprised of thirty-four countries and two regional organizations,53 with an additional
eight associate members and thirty observers.54
The FATF’s mandate is broad: to combat money laundering, terrorist financing,
the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to
the integrity of the international financial system.55 In 1990, the FATF developed a
comprehensive master plan called the Forty Recommendations, 56 which were
51.

See Good Practices, supra note 9, at 1; 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23. The FATF initially
focused on AML measures, but later adopted Recommendations specifically targeting the financing of
terrorism.

52.

See Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85; Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall, International Arbitration and Money
Laundering, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1021, 1029–31 (2005) (briefly summarizing the FATF’s origins).

53.

FATF Members include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, the
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Gulf Co-operation Council, Hong
Kong, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kingdom of the Netherlands (i.e., the Netherlands, Antilles,
and Aruba), Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of South Korea, the
Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. Members and Observers, supra note 10; see also Shepherd, supra note 4,
at 85; Terry, supra note 21; Durrieu, supra note 8, at 121. The FATF charter members include the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at
121 n.396; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 nn.4–6 (noting that in 1989, world leaders created
the FATF to “develop and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing”).

54. The associate FATF members are: the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean

Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), the
Eurasian Group (EAG), the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group
(ESAAMLG), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD),
the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), and the
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). Members and Observers,
supra note 10; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85 n.6.

55.

Who We Are, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015);
see also Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 5–9 (providing an excellent discussion
of the FATF’s origins); see generally Shawn Donnan, A Qualified Defence of Economic Complexity, Fin. Times
(July 20, 2014, 7:05 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7b91cee6-0ce1-11e4-bf1e-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz3SWbFwzxJ (reviewing the book The Butterfly Defect and noting its author’s warning that
“globalisation is now so complex—and stretched so thin in some cases—that it is extremely vulnerable to
relatively small events that pose much larger risks,” and that the hyper-interconnectedness of the world
amplifies the consequences of local events).

56. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 & nn.4–6; see also United States, Fin. Action Task Force, http://

www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/unitedstates/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); United Kingdom, Fin. Action
Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/u-z/unitedkingdom/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015);
Germany, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/germany/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2015); France, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/france/ (last visited
Apr. 10, 2015); Italy, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/d-i/italy/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2015); Japan, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/j-m/japan/
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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designed to avoid interfering with legitimate economic transactions and “consist of
four major sections: (a) the framework of the Forty Recommendations, (b) the role of
national legal systems in combatting money laundering, (c) the role of financial
systems in combatting money laundering, and (d) international cooperation.”57
The FATF employs a three-pronged strategy to combat money laundering and
terrorist financing. First, the FATF establishes standards; second, it promotes the
“effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures,” and third,
it identifies money laundering and terrorist financing threats.58 As a political matter,
each FATF member must agree in writing to support the Recommendations and
policies, and submit to periodic Mutual Evaluations.59
Shortly after the September 11, 2011 attacks on the United States, the FATF
adopted another eight Recommendations, and an additional Recommendation in
October 2004, to help eliminate terrorist financing. These nine new Recommendations
supplemented the initial forty and became commonly known as the “40+9
Recommendations.”60 The United Nations Security Council underscored the
importance of the Recommendations by expressly endorsing them in 2005.61 In
2012, the FATF replaced the 40+9 Recommendations with a set of reformulated
Recommendations, now known as either the Forty Recommendations or FATF
Recommendations,62 and today they, along with their Interpretive Notes, “constitute
the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.”63
The FATF Recommendations direct members to develop risk-based rules for
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing. Unlike a rules-based approach, a
risk-based approach offers two benefits.64 First, it conserves members’ limited resources

57.

Shepherd, supra note 4, at 86; see generally Sam Fleming et al., Regulators Split on Too-Big-to-Fail Banks,
Fin. Times ( July 20, 2014, 6:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98e3f7d2-0e83-11e4b1c4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3SWbFwzxJ (highlighting the enormous difficulty in developing a
consensus concerning “the problem of banks that are too big to be permitted to fail” because of different
“countries’ legal regimes, corporate structures and banking traditions”).

58. See Who We Are, supra note 55.
59.

Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86; see infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (discussing the
consequences for failing to support the FATF’s policies).

60. See Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1; Terry, supra note 21, at 489.
61.

See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 122 (citing S.C. Res. 1617, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005)).

62. Although the 2012 consolidation reduced the 40+9 Recommendations to forty, the new Forty

Recommendations fully incorporate the substance of the nine post–9/11 provisions. See Terry, supra note
21, at 489 & nn.5–7.

63. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1; see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 88; Durrieu, supra

note 8 at 121 (asserting that the Forty Recommendations are “the key legal standards in the global
policy against [money laundering] and [terrorist financing]”).

64. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the “rules-based approach [as] requir[ing]

compliance with every element of detailed laws, rules, or regulations irrespective of the underlying
quantum or degree of risk”).
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for combatting AML and CFT activities.65 Second, the risk-based strategy allows
members to focus their limited resources on situations and persons that pose the greatest
risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.66 For example, Recommendations 4
through 25 outline risk-based preventative measures for financial institutions and, on a
more limited basis, for designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs),
such as realtors and lawyers, to combat money laundering.67 These same AML
preventative measures apply to terrorist financing.68
The Recommendations’ preventative measures become de facto mandatory
obligations for FATF members who want to avoid being found noncompliant.69
Generally, the Recommendations are sufficiently flexible to allow a country to adopt
rules compatible with its economic circumstances and legal system.70 For example,
Recommendation 23 provides that lawyers and other DNFBPs “should be required to
report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in financial
transactions in relation to the activities described in paragraph (d) of Recommendation
22.”71 The list covers a broad range of legal services including: “[the] buying and selling
of real estate; managing of client money, securities or other assets; management of
bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of contributions for the creation,
operation or management of companies; creation, operation or management of legal
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.”72
The notion of lawyers filing STRs prompted significant controversy within legal
professions from around the world, with opponents arguing that the policy violated
principles of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and that it might
interfere with the administration of justice and rule of law.73 The controversy caused
the FATF to adopt an Interpretative Note to Recommendation 23, which provides
65.

See Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2–3 (encouraging “the legal profession generally” to
voluntarily develop risk-based strategies that comport with “the practical realities of the practice of law”);
see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 85–86 (noting that in 1989, world leaders created the FATF to “develop
and promote national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing”).

66. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2–3.
67.

Schott, supra note 16, at VI-2. Some rules sound less risk-based and generally more proscriptive, such
as Recommendation 3, which suggests that members criminalize money laundering. See 2012
Recommendations, supra note 23, at 12; Shepherd, supra note 4, at 89.

68. Schott, supra note 16, at II-2.
69. FATF members who are found noncompliant may face a diminished international reputation. Id. at III-11;

see also infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text (explaining potential sanctions and their consequences).

70. Schott, supra note 16, at II-1.
71.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 20.

72. Id.
73. See Terry, supra note 21, at 492 (“Given the legal profession’s important role with respect to the

administration of justice . . . the legal profession thought it was important to have . . . its situation
[addressed separately,] rather than including it with casinos, precious metal dealers, and others.”); Ellen
S. Podgor, Regulating Lawyers: Same Theme, New Context, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 19 (“As [the FATF]
[R]ecommendations move from policy into practicality, it is important to consider the appropriate
balance needed to maintain a strong adversarial system of justice.”). Professor Podgor also notes that
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that lawyers “are not required to report [suspicious transactions] if the relevant
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to professional
secrecy or legal professional privilege.” 74 Ref lecting the f lexibility in the FATF
Recommendations, and in accordance with their legal system, U.S. lawyers are not
required to file STRs to Intelligence Units, unlike their counterparts in Great Britain
and elsewhere.75
B. The FATF’s Enforcement Policies

The FATF ultimately enforces its standards in two ways.76 First, FATF members
complete an annual self-assessment questionnaire concerning their implementation
of FATF policies,77 and the answers are reviewed by the FATF to ensure compliance
with the relevant standards.78 Second, there is a peer-review process through a
“Mutual Evaluation,” in which FATF members review each other and non-FATF
members for voluntary compliance with FATF’s standards.79 This FATF
some of these policy decisions may compromise the attorney’s role as advocate for the client, id. at 196,
and that protecting confidential attorney-client communications is an important principle, id. at 195.
74.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 83. The FATF Interpretive Notes provide clarification and
guidance concerning the application of particular Recommendations. See Shepherd supra, note 4, at 87.

75. See Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23 (“[M]andatory reporting of suspicion about a client is in

conflict with Rules 1.6 and 1.18, and reporting without informing the client is in conflict with Rule
1.4(a)(5).”); see also James T. Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law, J.
Prof. Law., 2010, at 197, 207 & n.48 (noting that the ABA has resisted the mandatory reporting of
STRs, even though STRs are required for financial institutions and DNFBPs under the USA
Patriot Act); see generally Arnold & Porter LLP, The Role of Lawyers in the Fight Against
Corruption: A Summary Report (2013) [hereinafter Role of Lawyers], available at http://www.
trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/af585d7d-6a7f-4c65-9b5c-3b5534118c74/file (considering legal issues
surrounding corruption and, in part, the different ethical approaches to disclosure and reporting for
lawyers based on a comparative survey of seventeen international jurisdictions including the United
States). “[T]here is no universal approach to the . . . responsibilities of lawyers when dealing with
corrupt practices,” but “it seems likely that more . . . countries will follow the trend of increased
disclosure championed by the European Union and the United States.” Id. at 5–6.

76. See generally Fin. Action Task Force, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with

the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems (Feb. 2013)
[hereinafter Methodology], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/
fatf%20methodology%2022%20feb%202013.pdf.

77.

See Schott, supra note 16, at III-9. For an example of a completed questionnaire, see Gibraltar’s 2002
self-assessment, which is available at: http://www.fsc.gi/download/terrorism/terrorismselfassess.pdf.

78. See Durrieu, supra note 8, at 124.
79. See Fin. Action Task Force, AML/CFT Evaluations and Assessments (2009), available at http://

www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Handbook%20for%20assessors.pdf. The Handbook
provides the following:
[A] typical assessment team will consist of four experts who should come from different
countries, and whose expertise must cover all aspects of the fight against money
laundering and the financing of terrorism. For larger or more complex jurisdictions,
additional experts could be required. Each evaluation/assessment team should therefore
be comprised of: a legal expert (a judge, a prosecutor or a Ministry of Justice representative);
two financial experts (experts in regulatory matters: from a Finance Ministry, a Central
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comprehensive peer review mechanism integrates international law concepts and has
been described as the “landmark achievement of the FATF regime,” 80 which has
“developed into a credible compliance assessment process, analyzing both members’
and nonmembers’ compliance with [FATF] standards.”81
The FATF Mutual Evaluation process incentivizes member countries “to become
more proactive in enforcement through a higher level of participation and involvement.”82
The United States and others wish to avoid being judged as noncompliant with FATF
standards, in part, to avoid being identified on a publicly available list as a “noncooperative countr[y] and territor[y]” (NCCT),83 jeopardizing their governments’
political standing both at home and abroad. “An NCCT country is encouraged to make
rapid progress in remedying its deficiencies,” as deficient countries and territories risk
having their FATF membership suspended.84 Noncompliance adversely reflects on
Bank or a regulatory authority. Expertise regarding the preventive measures is necessary
both for the financial sector and for the experts in preventive measures applied by
designated non-financial businesses and professions); and a law enforcement expert (from
operational services such as the police, customs or a financial intelligence unit).

Id. at 6; see also Methodology, supra note 76, at 120 (Evaluation Template published for use by assessors).
80. Beekarry, supra note 17, at 143.
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 144; see also Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing

of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 137, 144 (2011) (reporting an increase in the
number of countries participating “in the global AML/CTF initiatives and . . . adopt[ing] legislation” as a
“good indication of countries’ changing [their] behavior” and that 184 jurisdictions endorsed the FATF
standards, constituting more than eighty-five percent of the world and underscoring the long reach of the
compliance process); see generally 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 26 (“Countries should ensure
that there is a range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, civil or
administrative, available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by Recommendations 6, and 8 to 23,
that fail to comply with the AML/CTF requirements. Sanctions should be applicable not only to financial
institutions and DNFBPs, but also to their directors and senior management.” (Recommendation 35)).

83. See Schott, supra note 16, at III-10. The United States will have its Fourth Mutual Evaluation in 2015. See

Fin. Action Task Force, Global Assessments Calendar (2014), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/assessments/Global-assessment-calendar.pdf. The last evaluation, in 2006, found
the United States partially compliant on four points and noncompliant on three. See Terry, Intro to the 2008
FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4 (providing a helpful explanation and chart of the noncompliant and
partially compliant ratings for the United States from the 2006 FATF Third Mutual Evaluation).

84. Schott, supra note 16, at III-10. As James K. Jackson, a Specialist in International Trade and Finance

at the Congressional Research Service, noted in his 2012 report: “[The] FATF has no enforcement
capability, but can suspend member countries that fail to comply on a timely basis with its guidelines.
Recently, the FATF warned Turkey that its membership will be suspended in 2013 unless it becomes
more aggressive in criminalizing money laundering.” CRS Report, supra note 48, at 1. The following
year, however, the FATF reported:
On 7 February 2013, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted the Law on the
Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism, which was signed into law on 15 February
2013. The new law addresses many of the shortcomings identified in Turkey’s terrorist
financing offence and creates the legal basis for the freezing of terrorist assets. The
FATF welcomes this significant step made by Turkey, which improves the country’s
compliance with the international standards. As a consequence, the FATF has decided
not to suspend Turkey’s membership.
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nations’ reputations to honor their international obligations and potentially exposes
them to a system of sanctions, such as “blacklisting . . . accompanied by countermeasures.”85
The mere threat of being blacklisted often causes noncompliant countries to expeditiously
cure their deficiencies.86
There are potentially severe consequences for financial institutions and related
enterprises that deal with blacklisted countries. For example, in 2012, the New York
State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) fined the British bank Standard
Chartered $667 million for processing transactions for Iran and other countries
blacklisted by the United States.87 In another “related enterprise” case, the prominent
accounting firm, Price Waterhouse-Coopers (PWC), settled a claim in 2014 with
the NYDFS for $25 million.88 In that case, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ was
under regulatory scrutiny for conducting business with Iran and other blacklisted
countries, including routing some transactions through its New York branch.89 PWC
reviewed the transactions and submitted a report to regulators that it certified as
objective and impartial but, at the bank’s request, deleted language noting the bank’s
“special instructions” to employees to avoid drawing attention to transactions with
countries under U.S. sanctions.90

In spite of this positive step, there still remain a number of ongoing shortcomings in the
Turkish counter-terrorist financing regime. Turkey must address these shortcomings in
order to reach a satisfactory level of compliance with the FATF standards. Turkey has
committed to addressing these deficiencies and will submit, prior to the next FATF
meeting in June 2013, a report on how these deficiencies are being addressed.

Outcomes of the FATF Plenary, 20–22 February 2013, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.
org/countries/s-t/turkey/documents/outcomesofthefatfplenary20-22february2013.html (last updated
Mar. 8, 2013).
85. Beekarry, supra note 17, at 143 (noting the international concepts of “compliance, implementation and

effectiveness”); see also J.C. Sharman, Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money Laundering in
Developing States, 52 Int’l Stud. Q. 635, 652–53 (2008) (discussing how blacklisting, along with other
forces, have promoted the international spread of AML policies in developing countries); Shepherd,
supra note 4, at 83.

86. J.C. Sharman, The Bark Is the Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting 3

(2004), available at http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/5/9/9/4/
pages59944/p59944-1.php (noting that in all twenty-three instances where FATF blacklisting occurred,
or was about to occur, FATF compliance was achieved).

87.

See Protess & Bray, supra note 19 (highlighting a new settlement for failing to live up to an earlier
promise to adopt AML measures). Individual countries set fines for violating laws that are designed to
implement FATF guidelines. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 26.

88. Ben Protess, Altered Study Draws Fine for Auditor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 2014, at B1. A “related

enterprise” is an entity that facilitates the underlying illegal activity. See id.

89. Id.; see also Public Statement, Fin. Action Task Force, High-Risk and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions (June 27,

2014), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/
public-statement-june-2014.html (providing a general list of blacklisted countries, including Iran).

90. Protess, supra note 88.
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IV.	THE FATF: GATEKEEPING AND LAWYER ETHICS—REFLECTIONS

A. Gatekeeping

A decade after its genesis, the FATF identified several professions—such as
accountants and lawyers—as “gatekeepers” who were capable of assisting the FATF in
carrying out its mission.91 Recommendation 22 labels such professions as DNFBPs92
and transfers to them many of the same AML and CTF responsibilities in the preceding
Recommendations that apply primarily to financial institutions.93
The underlying rationale for lawyer gatekeeping is that lawyers are in a special
position to monitor and shape both current and prospective client behavior by
counseling them to follow the law.94 Lawyers’ specialized training in the art of
communication and persuasion, high professional ethics standards, and commitment to
justice and the public good95 make them an attractive choice to be societal gatekeepers.96
91.

Fin. Action Task Force, RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals ¶ 11 (2008) [hereinafter FATF
RBA], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20professions.
pdf (“Lawyers hold a unique position in society by providing access to law and justice for individuals and
entities . . . .”). For a general example of how U.S. policy has balanced the FATF Recommendations on
“gatekeepers” with the legal profession’s concerns about the attorney-client relationship, see the prepared
remarks of Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart Eizenstat before a congressional committee in 2000:
We are aggressively pursuing programs aimed at the lawyers, accountants and auditors
who function as “gatekeepers” to the financial system. While legal rules properly
insulate professional consultations from overly broad scrutiny and create a zone of safety
within which professionals can advise their clients, those rules should not create a cover
for criminal conduct.

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart Eizenstat House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services. (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/ls445.aspx; see also Paton, supra note 4, at 171 (discussing the
conception of the role of lawyer as “gatekeeper” and its close relationship to the “role of government in
determining the parameters of professional responsibility and regulation of the legal profession”);
Shepherd, supra note 4, at 89; Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 9–10;
Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 1.
92.

2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19.

93.

Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 2. Examples of DNFBPs include “lawyers, notaries, trust
and company service providers (‘TCSPs’), real estate agents, accountants, and auditors.” Id. at 1.

94. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 (“The underlying theory behind the ‘lawyer-as-gatekeeper’

idea is that the lawyer has the capacity to monitor and to control, or at least to influence, the conduct of
his or her clients and prospective clients in order to deter wrongdoing.”); Shepherd, supra note 4, at 88
n.28 (quoting Fin. Action Task Force, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000–2001, at
12 (2001), available at http://fincen.gov/pdf/fatftypologie.pdf) (noting that lawyers are viewed as good
“gatekeepers” because of their ability to provide access “to the various functions that might help the
criminal move or conceal” funds).

95. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer 18 (1993) (discussing the lawyer-statesman ideal and the

classic role of lawyers to serve justice and the public not for personal gain, but to promote the public good).

96. See Elizabeth J. Hubertz, Public Interest, Professional Bargains: Ethical Conflicts Between Lawyers and

Professional Engineers, 31 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 83, 91 (2009) (quoting Model Code of Prof’l
Responsibility pmbl. ¶ 13 (2002)) (“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.”); see also
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. ¶ 13 (2014) [hereinafter Model Rules].
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Although this theory is not new, empirical evidence supporting its efficacy in shaping
client conduct is difficult to find.
Lawyer conduct that fails to exhibit a concern for professional ethics, justice, and
the public good is especially troublesome because lawyers have a special, governmentally
sanctioned role in protecting individual rights and promoting justice.97 The significant
increase in external regulation of the profession by governmental and other authorities
during the last generation is one consequence of lawyers failing this expectation by
engaging in unethical conduct.98
The concept that lawyers are gatekeepers has generated considerable debate both
in the legal academy and the profession.99 The American Bar Association (ABA)
recently noted this debate in Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money
Laundering, and Terrorist Financing, which was partly a response to “intergovernmental
standards-setting organizations and government agencies . . . suggest[ing] that lawyers
should be ‘gatekeepers’” to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.100 The
Opinion concluded that the “[r]ules do not mandate that a lawyer perform a
‘gatekeeper’ role,” but nevertheless endorsed the ABA Voluntary Good Practices
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing.101 The Guidance provides lawyers with a voluntary, risk-based approach
consistent with the useful FATF guidelines for CDD.102
The FATF has pressured the U.S. government to require lawyers to follow more
closely all of the Recommendations.103 The legal profession has responded, in part, by
asserting that such pressure is unnecessary since lawyer ethics rules already accomplish

97.

The very first sentence of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) underscores
the fundamental and central notion that lawyers “hav[e] a special responsibility for the quality of justice”
as “member[s] of the legal profession.” Model Rules, supra note 96, at pmbl. ¶ 1; see also Tim Dare,
The Counsel of Rogues? A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role 1
(2009) (“Ironically, the profession most obviously charged with the protection and defense of ‘ justice’ is
commonly regarded as being inimical to that very virtue.”). Dare goes on, however, to argue that lawyers
have moral grounds for their duties to clients that “may allow or require them to act in ways which
would be immoral were they acting outside of their professional roles.” Id. at 4; see generally Role of
Lawyers, supra note 75, at 5 (“[T]he traditional role of lawyers is that of defender of justice and
representative of individuals before the law[.] [T]he fall-out from lawyers being involved in corrupt
practices can be far greater than that of other professions, and rightly so.”).

98. See generally John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 959 (2009).
99. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 (“Many have taken issue with this theory and with the word

‘gatekeeper.’”) (footnote omitted). The ABA “do[es] not mandate that a lawyer perform a ‘gatekeeper’
role” in its Model Rules. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1–4 (commenting on the “usefulness” of the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance to lawyers for

avoiding unwitting involvement in money laundering and terrorism financing crimes).

102. Id. at 1–2.
103. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3 (“The federal government is under pressure from [the]

FATF and others (including development agencies . . . The World Bank, and the United Nations) to
adopt legislation implementing some or all of the provisions of the Recommendations . . . .”).
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many of the FATF’s AML and CTF goals.104 Most notably, for example, lawyers may
not assist clients in their criminal conduct,105 and lawyers risk professional discipline,
including disbarment, suspension, and even civil or criminal liability, for aiding in
such conduct.106
B. Lawyer Ethics Rules, the FATF, and CDD

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) reflect, and
help shape, the legal profession’s behavioral norms.107 Nearly every jurisdiction in the
United States has adopted the Model Rules to some degree,108 and lawyers must
follow their jurisdiction’s version or risk being disciplined for ethical transgressions.
In a sense, these rules and the Recommendations share a common purpose in
deterring lawyer participation in money laundering and terrorist financing.109 Several
Model Rules are consistent with—and arguably promote—the FATF’s AML and
CFT goals. In particular, Recommendation 10, entitled “Customer Due Diligence
and Record Keeping,” imposes certain CDD measures on lawyers similar to those
required by the Model Rules, albeit more generally.110
The FATF’s CDD acts like an early warning or detection system for financial
institutions and lawyers because it produces information regarding the likelihood of
money laundering and terrorist financing at the outset of the relationship.111 Since
104. Id. at 2 (noting the intense debate within the profession over concerns that the FATF might “undermine

the attorney-client privilege or the duty of client confidentiality or otherwise impede the delivery of
legal services generally”).

105. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 8.4(b).
106. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Kellogg, 933 N.E.2d 1085 (Ohio 2010) (suspending a lawyer convicted

of money laundering); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 929 N.E.2d 410 (Ohio 2010) (suspending an
attorney convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to commit bank fraud).

107. See Jack P. Sahl, Real Metamorphosis or More of the Same: Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of

Ethics 20/20, 47 Akron L. Rev. 1, 22 (2013) (Andrew Perlman, chief reporter for Ethics 20/20, “stated
that marketplace developments are the ‘predominant’ reason for changes in [lawyers’] behavioral norms
and that ‘ethics rule changes reinforce those normative developments in the marketplace and may even
cause some changes in the marketplace.’ Perlman does not think ‘it’s a one-way direction’”).

108. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Am. B. Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.

org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_
state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter ABA State Adoption].

109. See Schott, supra note 16, at VI-2. (noting that, in an earlier version of the Recommendations, many of

the same preventative measures could be found in Recommendations 5 through 25).

110. Recommendation 22 directs lawyers and other DNFBPs to follow the CDD and reporting requirements

aimed primarily at financial institutions as set out in earlier Recommendations. See 2012
Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20. Recommendation 22 specifically cites Recommendations
10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 as containing the CDD and reporting provisions. Id. DNFBPs also include:
casinos, real estate agents, and dealers in precious metals or stones and trust and company service
providers—for example, persons acting as a formation agent or as a director or partner of a trust or
company, as well as notaries, who are listed in the same subsection as lawyers. Id.

111. Both the FATF and the legal profession’s CDD standards also increase the chances for money laundering

and terrorism financing detection later in the attorney-client relationship because both regulatory regimes
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the CDD standards apply to all DNFBPs, the FATF creates an army of professionals
to serve on the front line of information gathering with respect to money laundering
and terrorist financing.112 As “front-line professionals,” these DNFBPs “furnish
access to the various [commercial, financial, and governmental] functions that might
help criminals move or conceal funds.”113 Potential money launderers or terrorist
financiers likely need to involve DNFBPs—especially lawyers—in the early stages of
their criminal scheme to avoid mistakes that may draw attention to them, which
underscores the need to identify such suspicious activity at its onset.
Recommendation 22 specifically requires lawyers and other DNFBPs to follow the
FATF’s CDD directives beginning in Recommendation 10. These directives require
lawyers to follow CDD procedures when “prepar[ing] for or carry[ing] out
transactions . . . concerning the following activities: (1) buying and selling of real estate;
(2) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (3) management of bank, savings
or securities accounts; (4) organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or
management of companies; [and] (5) [the] creation, operation or management of legal
persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.”114
The CDD outlined in the Recommendations preceding Recommendation 22 is
comprehensive and well-suited to achieving the FATF’s AML and CFT goals.115
For example, CDD procedures in Recommendation 10 require lawyers to: verify the
customer’s identity using reliable independent source documents, data, or information;
identify the beneficial owner of the customer; understand the purpose and intended
nature of the customer’s business or, in the case of lawyers, their professional
relationship to the client; and conduct ongoing due diligence throughout the
relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the
lawyer’s knowledge of the client and the client’s business and risk profile. This
ongoing duty also extends to ensuring that the client’s source of funds is consistent
with the lawyer’s knowledge of the client’s legitimate endeavors. When the lawyer
cannot comply with the due diligence above, Recommendation 10 directs the lawyer
to terminate the relationship.116
The level of necessary due diligence depends on the client’s identity, the countries
involved, and the type of service requested.117 Lawyers must apply their independent
require lawyers to continue monitoring their customer relationships. See 2012 Recommendations, supra
note 23, at 14 (mandating “ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions
undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are
consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including,
where necessary, the source of funds”).
112. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19.
113. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1 n.2.
114. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20.
115. Id. at 14–16, 17, 18 (CDD and reporting provisions).
116. Id. at 14–15.
117. The ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance notes “three major risk categories [for] legal engagements:

(a) country/geographic risk, (b) service risk, and (c) client risk.” Good Practices Guidance, supra note
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judgment in weighing each of these risk categories. The overall assessment will
inevitably “vary from one lawyer or firm to another because of the size, sophistication,
location, and nature and scope of services offered by the lawyer or the firm.”118
C. The Intersection: Lawyer Ethics Rules and the FATF

Although less detailed than the FATF requirements, lawyers are currently
obligated to engage in their own type of CDD. Model Rule 1.1 requires lawyers
to—at minimum—be competent in delivering legal services.119 Competency is a
multifaceted concept and arguably involves more than simply being a good legal
technician or knowledgeable in legal doctrine and procedure. It also involves
empathizing with the human dimensions of the client’s problems in an attempt to
support, counsel, and help the client reach a positive resolution of his problem.
Competency begins at either the initial interview or the intake stage, when Rule
1.2 requires the lawyer to reach a clear understanding with the client regarding the
scope of legal services to be provided.120 Further, the lawyer bears the burden of
effectively establishing the parameters of the representation with the client under Rule
1.4.121 The client-intake stage, in many ways, is the cornerstone of the attorney-client
relationship. The lawyer learns important facts about the client and the client’s problem,
identifies the legal issues, starts to formulate a representation strategy, considers
possible conflict of interests (both business and professional), and makes an initial
assessment of the client’s personality.122 For example, does the client impress the lawyer
as articulate and trustworthy? Also during the client-intake stage, important
professional and administrative matters are covered, and hopefully memorialized,
concerning fees, expenses, billing protocol, the ongoing responsibility of both lawyer
and client to communicate, and the confidentiality of their communications.

9, at 15. For a helpful discussion of each risk category, see id. at 119–30. See also Shepherd, supra note 4,
at 94; Terry, Intro to the 2008 FATF Lawyer Guidance, supra note 4, at 16 & nn.88–89.
118. Shepherd, supra note 4, at 94.
119. The Model Rules have been adopted with some modifications by every state in the nation. See ABA State

Adoption, supra note 108.

120. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.1 (Competence), R. 1.2 (Scope of Representation); see Jack P. Sahl, A

2014 Update: What Every Entertainment Lawyer Needs to Know—How to Avoid Being the Target of a Legal
Malpractice Claim or Disciplinary Action, in 1 Practising L. Inst., Counseling Clients in the
Entertainment Industry 2014, at 1-1069, 1-1105 (2014) [hereinafter Counseling Clients]
(“[C]ompetent handling of a matter starts with the initial client and case screening.”).

121. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.4(a)(3), (5) (directing the lawyer “to keep the client reasonably

informed about the status of the [representation]” and to “consult . . . about any relevant limitation on
the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the
[Model Rules] or other law”); see id. R. 1.2.

122. See Sahl, supra note 120, at 1-1084 (emphasizing the importance of screening a client at the intake stage

and listing steps for minimizing the likelihood of a malpractice or disciplinary action).

477

LAWYER ETHICS AND THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE: A CALL TO ACTION

Rule 1.18 imposes a duty on lawyers to protect confidential communications with
a prospective client, even if an attorney-client relationship is never formed.123 This
significant ethical obligation is designed to facilitate the flow of information from the
client as early as possible and set a precedent for the entire professional relationship,
promoting better-informed decisionmaking by the lawyer and a better understanding
of the client’s identity and needs.124
It is also important at the intake stage to highlight Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits
the lawyer from assisting a client in fraudulent or criminal conduct.125 Rule 8.4
expressly identifies such assistance as “misconduct,” and further states that any
attempt to circumvent an ethics rule subjects the lawyer to professional discipline
and possible termination of the relationship.126 The intake stage provides a special
opportunity for the lawyer to remind the client at the outset that, although they have
a professional relationship, he is bound both ethically and legally by Rule 1.2(d).127
The confluence of the mandates in Rules 1.1, 1.2(d), and 8.4 should result in the
lawyer obtaining substantial client information and underscoring his duty to refrain
from facilitating any illegal conduct the client may wish to carry out. This result is
designed to accomplish the same AML and CFT goals reflected in the FATF CDD
directives for DNFBPs.128
The lawyer may also wish to discuss Rule 1.16(a)(1) at the intake stage because this
rule prohibits him from performing services that violate any law or ethical rule129 and
123. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.18. Model Rule 1.18(b) recognizes that, under Model Rule 1.9,

information concerning a former client may be revealed, which constitutes an exception to the general
rule against revealing information learned in consultation with a prospective client. Id. R. 1.18(b)

124. See Sahl, supra note 120, at 1-1082 n.33. “Honest and full communication with the lawyer is promoted

by educating the client about the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and the lawyer’s ethical obligation
to protect information relating to representation. It is important that the lawyer discuss these concepts
and their limitations with the client as soon as possible.” Id.

125. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 8 (“CDD is not intended to place the lawyer in an

adversarial relationship with the client; rather, the purpose is to make sure the lawyer knows the true
identity and business goals of the client.” (emphasis added)); see also FATF RBA, supra note 91, at 31–32
(containing a principal at paragraph 114 under the subheading, “Customer Due Diligence/Know Your
Customer,” and “intend[ing] to enable a legal professional to form a reasonable belief that [he] has
appropriate awareness of the true identity of each client”).

126. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 8.4(a)–(c). It is also misconduct “to knowingly assist or induce another [to

violate, or attempt to violate, the Model Rules], or do so through the acts of another.” Id. R. 8.4(a).

127. Counseling Clients, supra note 120, at 1-1078 to -1079.
128. See Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23.
129. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.16(a)(1). Lawyers representing organizations, such as real estate

partnerships or charities, may wish to inform their entity clients that they cannot facilitate unlawful
client conduct, such as money laundering, and that they may have to report any information regarding
such conduct to higher authorities in the organization. Id. R. 1.13(b). Entity lawyers are even authorized
to reveal confidential information relating to the representation of persons outside the organization
if “necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.” Id. R. 1.13(c)(2). See generally Louise L.
Hill, The Financial Action Task Force Guidance for Legal Professionals: Missed Opportunities to Level the
Playing Field, J. Prof. Law., 2010, at 163 (criticizing the FATF’s decision to exclude in-house counsel
from the definition of legal professionals and, thus, not subject to the Recommendations); Paul D. Paton,
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requires him to withdraw if he has already undertaken representation.130 Raising the
possibility of withdrawal at the intake stage sends the client a powerful message
regarding the lawyer’s continuing ethical obligations to avoid illegal conduct, which
promotes a positive ethical tone for the duration of the attorney-client relationship.131
The possibility of withdrawal from representation under Rule 1.16 may raise
questions, however, about the lawyer’s duty to protect client information. Rule 1.6
generally prohibits the lawyer from revealing client information that could be
harmful or embarrassing to the client.132 However, Rules 1.6(b)(1) through (3) permit
the lawyer to reveal client information in certain circumstances, including to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm to a third party.133 The lawyer
may also reveal information under Rule 1.6(b)(2) “to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another” when the client has used or is using
the lawyer’s services to further the activity.134 Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits similar
disclosures to rectify or mitigate substantial injury to the financial and property
interests referenced in Rule 1.6(b)(2) if the client has used the lawyer’s services to
commit a crime or fraud.135 These three exceptions to the duty of confidentiality
provide substantial breathing room for the lawyer to disclose client information with
respect to money laundering and terrorist financing, which furthers, in effect, the
FATF’s efforts to prevent these crimes.136
In addition to Rule 1.6’s protection of client confidences and other information,
the attorney-client evidentiary privilege also protects against the disclosure of
confidential client communications.137 While the scope of the attorney-client
Corporate Counsel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era, 84 Canadian B. Rev.
533 (2006) (discussing the heightened tensions and demands on in-house lawyers and their ethical
responsibilities).
130. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.16. Model Rule 1.16(a) provides mandatory withdrawal provisions;

Model Rules 1.16(b)(1) and (2) permit a lawyer to withdraw if “the client persists in a course of action
involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent” or if “the
client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud.” Id.

131. Lawyer withdrawal must be accomplished in a manner that minimizes harm to the client, such as

protecting client confidences. See id. R. 1.16(b), (d).

132. Id. R. 1.6.
133. Id. R. 1.6(b)(1).
134. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).
135. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3).
136. The client must be using, or has used, the lawyer’s services in connection with the commission of the

crimes before the lawyer may reveal the information under Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (3). There is no
similar limitation under Rule 1.6(b)(1) concerning the lawyer’s disclosure of client information to
prevent reasonably certain death or bodily injury—arguably a “reasonably certain result” from the
financing of terrorism. Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.6.

137. See In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is well-established that communications that

otherwise would be protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product privilege are not
protected if they relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or ongoing criminal or
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evidentiary privilege is different than the ethical rules, it too does not protect a
client’s confidential communications in the furtherance of a crime.138 Thus, since the
FATF policy defers to members’ policies regarding privileged attorney-client
communications,139 U.S. lawyers are not required to keep confidential client
communications that facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.140
CDD is a fundamental obligation for any entity or professional furthering the
FATF’s AML and CFT goals.141 Similarly, CDD constitutes a core ethical
responsibility for lawyers delivering competent legal services. This duopoly of concern
with CDD highlights the common ground between the legal profession and the FATF
in helping lawyers to avoid unwittingly assisting clients in money laundering and
terrorist financing schemes.142 Of course, there will be some lawyers who will
knowingly aid miscreants in these crimes.143 No amount of CDD—under the FATF
regime, the Model Rules, or otherwise—will deter them from their criminal ends.
“Bad apples” aside, the current CDD regimes in both the FATF and legal ethics codes
fraudulent conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Marc Rich & Co. v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated September 15, 1983), 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984))).
138. See id. at 40; see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics §§ 6.1–.7 (1986) (discussing

both the ethical obligation of confidentiality and the attorney-client evidentiary privilege).

139. 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 83 (“Lawyers . . . are not required to report suspicious

transactions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to
professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.”); see also Shepherd, supra note 4, at 90 n.32 (noting
that the FATF “opposed any law or regulation that would compel lawyers to disclose privileged or
confidential information to government officials based on ‘suspicious’ activity of the client, or otherwise
compromise the attorney-client relationship or independence of the bar”).

140. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. ABA Formal Opinion 463 notes that lawyers are ethically

prohibited from filing STRs about clients. Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23. While this is a good
policy, the attorney-client evidentiary privilege does not protect client communications for the purpose of
furthering criminal activity. Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits lawyers to disclose communications if the
lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure is reasonably necessary “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s
services.” Model Rules, supra note 96, R. 1.6(b)(3). The Rules also allow disclosure when necessary “to
prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud” under similar conditions. Id. R. 1.6(b)(2).

141. See 2012 Recommendations, supra note 23, at 19–20. Recommendation 20 states that if a bank

suspects that “funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should
be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions” to authorities. Id. at 19.

142. See Lawton P. Cummings & Paul T. Stepnowsky, My Brother’s Keeper: An Empirical Study of Attorney

Facilitation of Money Laundering Through Commercial Transactions, J. Prof. Law., 2011, at 30–34.

143. See, e.g., Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Kranitz (In re Kranitz), 848 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. 2014)

(disciplining a lawyer convicted of securities fraud by suspending his license for two years); Office of
Lawyer Regulation v. Berman (In re Berman), 841 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 2014) (same); Office of Lawyer
Regulation v. Stern (In re Stern), 830 N.W.2d 674 (Wis. 2013) (lawyer involved in assisting client in
bankruptcy convicted of money laundering); see also Richmond v. N.H. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof ’l
Conduct, 542 F.3d 913 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the state supreme court had inherent power to
regulate the profession for violating the professional conduct rules); Terry, supra note 21, at 499 &
nn.55–56 (listing several cases and revealing that lawyers have been convicted of money-laundering and
terrorist financing, with some lawyers “mastermind[ing] the money laundering schemes” and others
“appear[ing] to have been brought into these criminal schemes by their clients or other associates”).
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should significantly protect both the bar and the public from lawyers unwittingly
participating in money laundering and terrorist financing crimes.
V. CONCLUSION

The FATF and its policies promise to generate increased governmental and
public attention as the world grapples with the ever-persistent crimes of money
laundering and terrorist financing, especially with the latter seemingly spiraling both
in the amount of money involved and horror of the crimes it facilitates.144 This
attention is especially likely in the United States where the FATF, along with
development agencies such as The World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, are pressuring the U.S. government “to adopt legislation implementing . . . the
Recommendations [that] relat[e] to the legal profession.”145 In addition, a New York
federal court has held for the first time that terrorist attack victims and their families
could recover damages from an international bank for knowingly processing
transactions that supported the attacks.146 This decision should lead both the public
and the bar to pay more attention to terrorist financing and make banks more
cautious when processing financial transactions with potential terrorist links.147
The legal profession’s attention to the FATF is poignantly illustrated by the
ABA’s adoption of the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance148 and the related Formal
Opinion 463.149 These guidelines, in particular, offer lawyers a valuable tool for
“designing and implementing effective risk-based approaches consistent with the
144. See, e.g., Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, Self-Funded and Deep-Rooted: How ISIS Makes Its Millions,

CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding/ (noting
that ISIS “probably makes between $1 million and $2 million per day, but probably on the lower end”);
Andy Brownfield, Luxury Cars, Foreign Buyers and a First-of-Its Kind Ruling in Cincinnati, Cinc. Bus.
Courier (June 12, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2014/06/12/luxurycars-foreign-buyers-and-a-first-of-its-kind.html (reporting a federal court decision concerning the
seizure of luxury vehicles and the “nationwide effort by the U.S. Secret Service and Department of
Homeland Security to crack down on the so-called ‘gray market’ of American companies buying luxury
vehicles stateside for resale overseas,” for fear that foreign purchasers are laundering money).

145. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3.
146. Stephanie Clifford & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Terrorism Trial of Mideast Bank Worries the Financial

World, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2014, at A17 (involving 297 plaintiffs who claimed injuries from twentyfour attacks by the terrorist organization Hamas, and asserting that a branch of the Arab Bank in
Beirut, Lebanon, knowingly financed Hamas by processing its banking transactions); Stephanie
Clifford, Hamas Transactions Got Through in Error, Bank Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2014, at A20.

147. See Stephanie Clifford, Jury Finds Arab Bank Liable for Aiding Terror, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2014, at A1

(reporting that a New York District Court jury found Arab Bank, a major Middle Eastern bank, liable for
supporting terrorist enterprises when it handled transactions for Hamas, which led to multiple attacks).

148. As a direct response to the FATF’s adoption of its Risk Based Approach (RBA) Guidance for Legal

Professionals, the ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance offers U.S. lawyers a more detailed
direction on the application of the RBA guidelines to specific factual situations, “tak[ing] into account
the practical realities of the practice of law in an increasingly complex environment.” Good Practices
Guidance, supra note 9, at 2.

149. The ABA’s Formal Opinion 463 endorsed the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance. Formal Opinion

463, supra note 23, at 1.
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broad contours of the [FATF] Lawyer Guidance.”150 It provides detailed direction on
applying the risk-based approach to preventing money laundering and terrorist
financing in specific practical situations.151 Moreover, the ongoing efforts of the
ABA Gatekeeper Task Force promise to help shape the profession’s involvement with
various governmental and private entities that ensure FATF compliance by keeping
the profession apprised of FATF developments.
Even with this backdrop of heightened attention to money laundering, terrorist
financing, and the FATF, there is concern that attorneys in the field will resist making
necessary changes to their practice.152 Traditionally, the legal profession has resisted
any regulation by external forces—governmental or private.153 According to
sociologists and other experts studying professional culture, lawyers (like other
professionals) claim that their specialized training154 and ethics code155 warrant their
150. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 3.
151. Id.
152. James E. Moliterno, Ethics 20/20 Successfully Achieved Its Mission: It “Protected, Preserved, and

Maintained”, 47 Akron L. Rev. 149, 160–61 (2014) (“The profession has resisted change” during its
“history of . . . self-regulation,” and the changes made were “in service of the status quo”).

153. Id. (concluding that generally a “change [to the legal profession] has been forced by influences of society,

culture, technology, economics, and globalization, and not by the profession itself ”); see Leubsdorf,
supra note 98, at 1018 (“Section 307 of [the] Sarbanes-Oxley [Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745, 784] required the SEC to issue rules requiring lawyers to report material breaches of securities
law or of fiduciary duty to the corporation’s chief counsel or chief executive officer, and if they did not
respond appropriately to go to a committee of the board of directors.”). For example, in order to avoid
legislation and continue self-regulation, Canada’s legal regulators recently passed two reforms, the “No
Cash” rule and the “Know Your Client” rule, in an effort to address the FATF Recommendations. For
a more in-depth analysis of Canada’s legal reform in light of the Recommendations and its implication
of self-regulation, see Paton, supra note 4.

154.

[T]he professional project tends toward the monopolization of opportunities for income
in a market of services or labor and toward the monopolization of status and work
privileges in an occupational hierarchy. The necessary means to these ends is the
control and monopolization of relatively standardized professional education. The
institutionalized production of professional producers mediates and reveals the
contradictions inherent in the structure of the professional project.

Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism 51 (1977); see also Eliot Freidson,
Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge (1986).
Since the nineteenth century . . . some kind of formal higher education marks
professionals off from other workers, distinguishing both the nature of their training
and the nature of their skill. Such education is a basic credential for professionals; it
delineates the foundation of their expertise. The distinction has lain at the root of
thinking about professions as a special class or category of occupations.

Id. at 26; William Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of
Law 21–22 (2007) (“A significant mark of professional privilege and social responsibility is the authority
that professions wield to require of their members training in specialized institutions and to assess the
fitness of candidates for admission to practice.”).
155. See Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74

Fordham L. Rev. 1079, 1084 (2005) (“Given the contours of this ethical dilemma, rules of professional
conduct are valuable because such rules solve the prisoners’ dilemma facing lawyers. If the sanctions for
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deciding how best to deliver their services and to protect the public’s interest.156 This
claim supports the bar’s ongoing monitoring of the FATF’s efforts, which may
fundamentally alter the profession’s historic role in protecting clients’ rights and access
to justice.
For example, the bar correctly resisted the FATF’s efforts to impose a duty on
lawyers to file STRs.157 The bar needs to recognize, however, that such resistance is
unwarranted with respect to the FATF’s CDD principles, which promote both
lawyers’ and the public’s interests. The FATF’s CDD protects lawyers from
unwittingly assisting clients with money laundering or terrorist financing crimes.
Educating lawyers about the FATF and the risks associated with the crimes of
money laundering and terrorist financing is important if the bar hopes to preclude
governmental entities under pressure from the FATF from regulating the delivery of
legal services. One way to inform the bar is to incorporate the FATF’s CDD into law
school legal ethics courses, which are required courses that are especially well-suited
for examining good lawyer practices. The ABA Voluntary Good Practices Guidance
two-page Client Intake Form (CIF) is a particularly effective way to introduce
students to the CDD procedures advocated by the FATF.158 The CIF underscores
the increasingly globalized nature of legal practice, the risks involved, and the need
to develop good practice protocols. For example, the CIF’s procedures provide
specific questions for identifying both the “natural person client”159 and the “entity
client,”160 and recommend checking the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially

unprofessionalism are high enough, then lawyers and law firms no longer would have any incentive to
cheat by acting unprofessionally.”).
156. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1147, 1148 n.9 (2009) (“The

public must have confidence that the legal profession, which is self-regulated, will not look the other
way when its members break the law.”).

157. See supra notes 23, 71–75 and accompanying text; see also Formal Opinion 463, supra note 23, at 1

(rejecting the filing of STRs as unethical).

158. Good Practices Guidance, supra note 9, at 38.

Id.

[D]epending upon the nature of the representation and level of initial concern the
lawyer may have regarding the intentions or background of the client, the lawyer may
need to obtain some or all of the following information: the client’s name, employment
background, place of birth, prior residential addresses, current residential address,
business address, phone numbers, date of birth, marital status, names of prior or current
spouses and/or names of children, dates of birth and social security numbers of any
such spouses and/or children, the name and contact information of any other lawyers
with whom the client regularly deals, the name and contact information of the client’s
certified public accountant, prior criminal convictions, pending lawsuits, and status of
tax filings with governmental authorities.

159. Id.
160. Id. Under certain circumstances, the guidelines recommend investigating the entity’s “beneficial

ownership, as discussed in more detail in the main body of this guidance.” Id. at 39.
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Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.161 These CDD suggestions are the
kind of good practice skills that law schools should be imparting to their students.162
In short, the CIF simply lays out a sound roadmap for practicing law regardless of the
practice field or the degree of risk involved in representing a client.
In addition to law schools teaching students about the FATF, courts and bar
associations should help inform lawyers about the FATF and its policies.163 For
example, the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force should continue its important mission of
educating U.S. lawyers about FATF issues.164 Ideally, the practicing bar and legal
academia would collaborate to offer conferences focusing on the FATF, similar to
the symposium held at New York Law School.165 To be sure, lawyers who learn about
the FATF and adopt the CDD procedures outlined in the CIF will be less likely to
unwittingly become involved in money laundering, terrorist financing, or other
criminal schemes. The time for the bar to act and to answer the call for CDD change
is now—not later.

161. Id. at 39 (“It would also be prudent for the lawyer to check the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially

Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list . . . for the name of the client, the client’s spouse, the
client’s beneficial owners, and/or other related persons, and any relevant business entities.”).

162. See generally Douglas Godfrey, Transactional Skills Training: All About Due Diligence, 10 Tenn. J. Bus. L.

357 (2009) (suggesting how due diligence training can be incorporated into a law student’s training).

163. See Terry, supra note 21, at 505 (“There also have been concerted efforts to educate ethics experts . . . . The

goal is to have a ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach to [legal ethics] education that begins in law school and
concludes by educating [those] responsible for disciplining lawyers.” (citations omitted)).

164. See id. (highlighting existing sources and recommending additional ways to inform lawyers about the

FATF).

165. New York Law School Law Review Symposium: Combating Threats to the International Financial

System: The Financial Action Task Force (Apr. 25, 2014). For more information and recordings of this
symposium, visit: http://www.nylslawreview.com/fatf/.

484

